On the evening of 6 May 1991, two big cargo ships were sailing off the east coast of Brazil near the port of Ubu. The Topaz was a very large ore/oil carrier heading west in ballast to pick up cargo. The Irapua was a smaller bulk carrier heading north with wheat on board. It was dark but the weather was fine and visibility was good. This matters because bad weather did not cause what happened next. The ships were on crossing courses: Topaz had the right to stand on, and Irapua had the duty to keep clear. These roles come from the navigation rules that apply at sea.
From the Topaz bridge, the officer on watch saw a ship on the port side, first by radar and then with binoculars. He could see the other ship’s green side light, which means the other ship was to his left and coming across. He believed the other ship, later confirmed as Irapua, stayed on a steady bearing, which is a classic sign of risk of collision. He tried light signals, used the radio, and even sounded five short blasts on the whistle when the ships were getting closer. He then altered Topaz’s course about 10 degrees to starboard as a precaution and, in the final moments, ordered hard-a-starboard. Despite this, the ships still collided.
Why did they crash? The court focused on who should have done what under the sea rules. In a crossing situation, the give-way ship must take early and substantial action to keep well clear, and the stand-on ship keeps course and speed unless it becomes clear the other ship is not doing the right thing—then the stand-on ship may, and sometimes must, maneuver to avoid collision. Irapua never saw Topaz at all, either by eye or by radar, until the impact. That is a basic failure of lookout and radar use, and it also meant Irapua took no avoiding action. In the court’s words, Irapua’s navigation was deplorable.
So was Topaz blameless? Not entirely. The judge accepted that Topaz did make a small 10-degree turn to starboard several miles out. But once it was apparent that Irapua wasn’t taking proper action, good seamanship called for more than a “nibble.” The court said a bold alteration to starboard—at least 30 degrees—was needed at that stage to make the passing safe. Waiting until about a minute and a half before the collision to go hard-a-starboard was too late for a ship as large as Topaz. That timing fell foul of the stand-on ship’s duty to act when collision cannot be avoided by the give-way ship alone. In short: Topaz waited too long and turned too little.
But the court also looked at the big picture. Irapua’s team admitted they failed to keep a proper lookout and thus broke several rules. This was the main cause. Topaz’s shortcomings happened in a situation forced on her by Irapua’s complete inaction. The judge described Irapua’s failure to see or respond as “inexcusable” and “fortunately rare.” That language shows just how seriously the court viewed Irapua’s faults.
Now for the result, explained plainly. In ship collision cases, the court divides blame by percentages based on how much each ship’s faults contributed. Here, both ships were at fault, but not equally. Because Irapua failed to look out and never took action, and because Topaz’s mistakes were smaller and came later, the court decided that Irapua should take most of the blame. The final apportionment was 80% against Irapua and 20% against Topaz—expressed as “80/20 in favour of Topaz.” That means the owners of Irapua must pay most of the damages for the collision, while Topaz bears a smaller share because she should have turned earlier and by more when it became clear Irapua wasn’t keeping clear.
So the story ends like this: two ships crossed at night; one had the duty to give way and didn’t; the other had the right to stand on but waited too long to make a big, obvious turn. The court held that Irapua’s failures were overwhelming, but Topaz should have done more once danger was clear. That is why the judgment split liability 80% Irapua and 20% Topaz, with the reasoning rooted in the crossing rules and the timing and size of Topaz’s late maneuvers.
